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Abstract An increasingly common complaint about philosophy of religion—
especially, though not exclusively, as it is pursued in the “analytic tradition”—is
that its preoccupation with questions of rationality and justification in relation to
“theism” has deflected attention from the diversity of forms that religious life takes.
Among measures proposed for ameliorating this condition has been the deployment
of “thick description” that facilitates more richly contextualized understandings of
religious phenomena. Endorsing and elaborating this proposal, I provide an over-
view of different but related notions of thick description before turning to two
specific examples, which illustrate the potential for engagement with ethnography to
contribute to an expanded conception of philosophy of religion.
Keywords Thick description · Expanding philosophy of religion · Radical
pluralism · Ethnography · Interdisciplinarity · Animal sacrifice · Buddhism
[I]f one wants to philosophize about religion, then one needs to understand
religion in all its messy cultural-historical diversity. Insofar as one considers
only a limited set of traditions or reasons, one’s philosophy of religion is
limited. (Knepper 2013, p. 76)
What’s ragged should be left ragged. (Wittgenstein 1998, p. 51)
A common and thoroughly understandable complaint about much contemporary
philosophy of religion is that its scope remains abysmally restricted. While
purporting to investigate religion in general, most of what goes by the name of
philosophy of religion continues to be preoccupied with a narrow range of questions
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concerning an ahistorical and decontextualized “theism.” The restriction is twofold.
First, the fixation on a homogeneous theism inhibits a fuller cognizance of the
variety of forms that religions, both theistic and nontheistic, can and do take; that is,
it inhibits due consideration being given both to the discongruities between different
forms of theistic religion, whether within or beyond the Abrahamic traditions, and to
nontheistic (or not straightforwardly theistic) traditions such as we see in certain
versions of Buddhism, Jainism, Daoism, nondualist Vedānta and the indigenous
traditions of many small-scale societies around the world. Second, the preoccupa-
tion with “beliefs” (commonly construed narrowly in terms of “propositional
attitudes”) and with the arguments supposed to support them diverts attention away
from other aspects—what Ninian Smart (1996) termed the other “dimensions of the
sacred,” such as the ritual, mythic, experiential, ethical, legal, social, material and
political dimensions.1
Calls for more inclusive approaches are far from new. Not only Smart but also
figures such as John Hick were pioneering in their advocacy of attention to religious
ideas from outside the Abrahamic milieu; and over recent decades several
philosophers of religion have made concerted efforts both to incorporate a wide
array of religious traditions into the philosophical conversation2 and in some cases
to expand the discipline’s purview to encompass philosophical analyses of aspects
such as myth, ritual, physical location and prayer.3 However, as perceptive
innovators such as Timothy Knepper (cited in my first epigraph above) have argued,
continued effort is needed if philosophy of religion is to genuinely reflect the
diversity that obtains within the religious lives of humanity in general rather than
only a small portion of it. This effort is important because it bears upon the extent to
which philosophers of religion can legitimately claim to have got a firm grasp on the
very phenomenon they profess to be studying. While it would be unreasonable to
expect any philosopher to gain a thorough understanding of even a modest subset of
the enormous range of religious traditions and phenomena that have characterized
the cultural lives and histories of humankind, there remains an onus upon those who
wish to speak about religion in general to explicitly recognize the diversity.
One way of conceptualizing the problem is in terms of abstraction. When
philosophers of religion speak of “theism” or “bare theism” or “standard theism,”
etc., what they are often trying to do is enable their arguments to apply to more than
one sect, denomination or religion. They may presume, for example, that Judaism,
Christianity and Islam, notwithstanding the multiple differences between these
1 As Smart (1999) further notes—though this is not my main focus in this article—broadening one’s
analysis to encompass these dimensions also helps to highlight the complex interrelations and overlaps
between “religious” and “secular” worldviews, thereby helping to avoid distortedly essentialist
conceptions of religion.
2 See, e.g., Clayton (2006), Griffith-Dickson (2005), Kessler (1999) and the series of books by Arvind
Sharma taking different perspectives on the philosophy of religion, such as Sharma (1995).
3 See, e.g., Schilbrack (2002, 2004) and Wynn (2009). For a feminist perspective on the importance of
attention to religious practice in addition to “belief,” see Hollywood (2004). For a study of prayer (albeit
an older classic rather than a recent contribution), see Phillips (1965).
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religions and the sectarian divergences within them, are all “theistic.”4 On this
account, to speak of “theism” rather than more specifically of Judaism, Christianity
or Islam is a move in the direction of inclusivity. Some philosophers have taken this
abstractive approach a stage further, by replacing talk of “theism” with talk of
something common to all religions, be they “theistic” or “nontheistic.” For John
Hick (e.g., 2004), the unifying principle is “the Real”—a principle which no religion
explicitly recognizes but which, according to Hick, they are all implicitly directed
towards. Thus, although Hick was indeed a pioneer in promoting a more inclusive
conception of religion, his conception could be regarded as unhelpfully homoge-
nizing insofar as it presumes all religions to have a single essence. While calling his
approach “pluralism,” he ends up with a diminished appreciation of what
D. Z. Phillips (2007) has termed the radical plurality of religious and nonreligious
perspectives on the world.
A hazard of any abstractive move is the loss of contact with the real-life
phenomena to which one’s discussion was intended to have relevance in the first
place. If the god of the philosophers—let alone some noumenal “Real”—is not a
god to whom anyone wittingly prayed or bowed down in worship, then a problem
arises for the whole enterprise of an abstractive philosophy of religion: to the extent
that it loses touch with people’s actual religious lives, it risks leading us away from
rather than towards a deeper understanding of religion.
The issue of how to expand the scope of philosophy of religion is thus
inextricably linked to matters of methodology. Without needing to deny that certain
forms of abstraction can have a legitimate place in philosophical investigations of
religion, it is worth exploring what other options are available. One option that a
growing number of philosophers have begun to explore is that of increasing
interdisciplinary engagement between philosophy and certain areas of the empirical
study of religion, including the anthropology and sociology of religion along with
the broad multidisciplinary area known as religious studies. A term that has gained
prominence in these more empirically oriented disciplines since the 1970s is “thick
description,” which many scholars, following Clifford Geertz (1973), have adopted
to characterize forms of description that endeavour to go beyond the mere surface of
a given event or situation or state of affairs—to show the various layers of meaning
or significance that constitute its place within the broader context of human lives.
The term “thick description” in fact has its origins in philosophy, having first been
coined in a pair of essays by Gilbert Ryle (1968a, 2009 [1968b]), and hence recent
suggestions that philosophers of religion would do well to deploy thick description
themselves (Knepper 2013, 2014; Burley 2015, p. 236) are not calls simply to help
oneself to methodological resources from empirical disciplines: they are in a sense
also calls for philosophers to revive and develop philosophical methods that have
lain largely dormant for several decades.
While the latter methodological suggestion is a fruitful one, there is still much
work to be done in showing how it is to be realized in practice. The purpose of this
article is to make a contribution to that task both by elucidating the concept of thick
4 See, e.g., Swinburne (2004, p. 7): “The claim that there is a God is called theism. Theism is, of course,
the core belief of the creeds of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam”.
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description, which, as we shall see, has itself become a highly variegated concept,
and by exemplifying how thick description might promote a more nuanced
philosophical appreciation of the ramified and multifarious possibilities of human
religious life. This appreciation, in many ways, makes the project of philosophy of
religion harder, as it brings to light the messiness or raggedness of religion, when
many philosophers may prefer their object of inquiry to have smoother edges. But if
our aim is to gain a deeper understanding, then smoothing over the rough edges is
unlikely to serve that purpose. “What’s ragged should be left ragged,” as
Wittgenstein concisely put it.
Varieties of thick description
The term “thick description” has had a long and complicated history since its first
use by Ryle in two papers published in 1968. Ryle’s purpose in introducing the term
was to distinguish between different degrees of complexity and richness with which
a description of someone’s behaviour might be imbued. Although many commen-
tators have tried to capture Ryle’s distinction in terms of a general account of what
“thin” and “thick” descriptions consist in respectively, it is doubtful whether any
such general account could be successful, since the terms are relative both to each
other and to the subject matter of the description. Thus it is advisable to think in
terms of thicker and thinner—or more and less thick—descriptions, as opposed to
descriptions that are, categorically, either thin or thick.
To illustrate the distinction, Ryle adduces several examples, the best known and
most thoroughly worked out of which is that of the winking boys. Ryle begins the
example by inviting us to suppose that two boys each do something that could, in
the thinnest terms, be described as contracting their right eyelids. But one of the
boys is merely twitching involuntarily whereas “the other is winking conspirato-
rially to an accomplice” (2009, p. 494). This conspiratorial winking, Ryle reminds
us, is a single action comprising several elements. Hence to describe it fully—to
describe it thickly—one should mention that it is a deliberate act intended to impart,
without anyone else noticing, a particular message to a specific person in
accordance with a previously agreed code (p. 495). Ryle subsequently imagines a
third boy who wishes to parody the conspiratorial winker. In practising the parody,
this third boy’s action could be described in terms of multiple nested forms of
trying: he is trying to prepare to try to entertain his friends by imitating someone
trying to convey a secret message to an accomplice by trying to contract his eyelids
(p. 496). As Ryle remarks, “The thinnest description of what the rehearsing parodist
is doing” would be approximately equivalent to that of “the involuntary eyelid
twitch; but its thick description is a many-layered sandwich, of which only the
bottom slice is catered for by the thinnest description” (pp. 496–497).
We can see, then, that for Ryle there is no blanket answer to be given to the
question of whether a thicker or a thinner description is appropriate, for
appropriateness will depend, minimally, upon what is being described. Thus if
someone has rapidly closed and opened her eye as a consequence of a habitual
twitch, a thin, uncomplicated, description is likely to suffice. But in other instances
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there may be several descriptive layers required in order to capture what the action
is that is being performed. Nor would it be unduly stretching Ryle’s point to add that
the appropriateness of a thicker or a thinner description will also hinge, in part, upon
the purpose for which the description is being offered—or requested. For example,
if one friend asks another what she was doing last night, and the second friend
replies that she went out for a walk, the description might be adequately thick for
the purpose, whereas if the same person is being interviewed by police as a crime
suspect, the interviewing officers are apt to be hoping for more detail, more
thickness.
Despite its having been coined by Ryle, the term “thick description” has become
most closely associated with the anthropologist Clifford Geertz—the veritable “ma-
hatma of ‘thick description’” (Shweder 2005, p. 1)—who invokes it to define what
he understands the research method known as ethnography to consist in.
Notwithstanding the contrived nature of Ryle’s example of the winking boys,
Geertz (1973, p. 7) proposes that it “presents an image only too exact of the sort of
piled-up structures of inference and implication through which an ethnographer is
continually trying to pick his way.” Several commentators have argued that there
are considerable differences between Ryle’s and Geertz’s uses of the term “thick
description.” Indeed, it has been claimed that Geertz turns the term’s meaning “on
its head” (Descombes 2002, p. 439; Bazin 2003, p. 432, n. 22) by conflating
description with interpretation. According to this contention, Ryle is concerned to
explicate an order of complexity that is strictly logical: to describe someone as
winking is, as it were, a first-level description, whereas to describe that person as
winking conspiratorially brings in a second level—it combines verb with adverb in
a logical structure that, in principle, could be added to indefinitely; Geertz, by
contrast, is declaring that for any situation or occurrence in which more than one
agent are involved, there will be multiple interpretations that the respective agents
have of what is going on, and thick description consists in the ethnographer’s
attempt to build a determinate picture—to “construct a reading of” (Geertz 1973,
p. 10)—the relevant situation out of the available data, including the agents’
respective interpretations. There is thus a sense in which ethnography is a
thoroughly interpretive endeavour: “explicating explications,” as Geertz puts it
—“Winks upon winks upon winks” (p. 9).
Against those who accuse Geertz of misunderstanding and hence of misappro-
priating Ryle’s notion of thick description by conflating description with
interpretation, it could be argued that the difference between presenting a contrived
though culturally familiar and entirely plausible example on the one hand, and, on
the other hand, describing real-life occurrences in cultures very different from one’s
own (and with which most of one’s readers are unlikely to be familiar) is of
considerable importance. Ryle and his readers can readily understand what it means
to wink conspiratorially, and to imitate someone winking conspiratorially, and to
practise imitating someone winking conspiratorially, and so on; and Ryle, as the
author of the example, has no need to interpret for his readers what is going on: he
simply describes it, as would the author of a novel. For this reason, plain
description, albeit adverbially or logically “thick,” accomplishes its task of
conveying the requisite information relatively straightforwardly. In the ethnographic
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context, however, the researcher often encounters difficulties in simply understand-
ing what the agents are doing. Figuring this out will commonly involve attending to
an extensive range of contextual factors that include what the various agents say
about what they are doing. While these latter accounts will not differ from one
another in terms of logical order, a description that draws upon all or several of them
will nevertheless comprise a certain layering or thickness, in something like the way
in which the sound of a choir, or even of a cocktail party, exhibits a thickness that is
lacking in a single voice. It is, then, possible to view Geertz’s appropriation of
“thick description” as an extension or adaptation—or recontextualization—of
Ryle’s original coinage without our needing to disparage it as a “misinterpretation”
(pace Bazin 2003, p. 432, n. 22).
What Geertz’s appropriation made possible was an explosion of further
appropriations of thick description within the social disciplines and humanities
more generally. Instrumental in this popularization of the term, and of the various
descriptive methods to which it has been attached, is work by Norman Denzin,
whose expositions of qualitative methods of data collection and analysis have
influenced generations of qualitative researchers since the 1970s.5 Among Denzin’s
innovations is the devising of a typology of eleven different forms that thick
description can take (Denzin 2001, ch. 6). I do not have the space here even to
merely summarize all eleven of these, but there are a few recurrent characteristics
that are worth mentioning. These characteristics include the capturing and recording
of “the voices of lived experience”—what Denzin, borrowing from Merleau-Ponty
(1973), terms the “prose of the world”—thereby creating “verisimilitude, a space for
the reader to imagine his or her way into the life experience of another” (Denzin
2001, p. 99). Thus not only voices in the literal sense, but also the “feelings, actions,
and meanings of interacting individuals are heard, made visible” (p. 100).
Ironically, by Denzin’s explicit criteria Ryle’s original examples would count
only as “typified, thinly veiled thick description” as opposed to “actual thick
description,” since the latter, according to Denzin (2001, p. 106), must describe
experiences or actions of real-life individuals rather than of concocted characters.
Denzin is, however, inconsistent on this point, as he has no trouble with invoking
passages from literary fiction in order to illustrate what he means by “biographical
thick description” (p. 108), which he appears to treat as genuine rather than as
merely “thinly veiled.” Given that descriptions of fictive scenes can be just as rich in
such features as contextual detail and verisimilitude as can descriptions of real-life
scenes, there seems little justification for regarding fictitiousness as precluding a
description from being genuinely thick. But if we are thinking in typological terms,
there are certainly good, and obvious, reasons for distinguishing between fictive and
non-fictive descriptions, even if we acknowledge that in many instances the
distinction is liable to become blurred.
For my purposes in this article, I am content to refrain from stipulating a tight
definition of thick description. The impression one is likely to glean from a survey
of the literature on this topic is that “thick description” is or has become, to use
5 His early work includes Denzin (1978 [1970]); his influential edited volumes include Denzin and
Lincoln (2011), now in its fourth edition.
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Wittgenstein’s term, a “family resemblance” concept, with “a complicated network
of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” but no characteristics that are
necessarily common to all uses (Wittgenstein 2009 [1953], §§66, 67).6 It is,
nevertheless, a serviceable concept, convenient for characterizing certain modes of
description in comparison with others. As I have suggested above, it is unlikely to
be very informative to propose that a description is either thick or thin simpliciter.
But it does not follow from this that it cannot be informative to describe one
description of a given phenomenon as thicker than another, perhaps while also
noting the particular respects in which its relative thickness resides.7
Thickly descriptive philosophy of religion
Notwithstanding its Rylean derivation, “thick description” is not a term that receives
much recognition from philosophers these days, whether in the philosophy of
religion or in any other branch of philosophical inquiry. There has, in recent years,
been considerable attention devoted in metaethics to “thick concepts,” and it has
occasionally been noted that this latter term, originated by Bernard Williams (1985),
was probably influenced by Ryle’s notion of thick description (Kirchin 2013, p. 60;
Väyrynen 2013, p. 1); but discussions directly about thick description are few and
far between in the philosophical literature. Among the exceptions to this is recent
work by Knepper (2013, 2014), who has called for thick description to be
undertaken specifically by philosophers of religion.
Knepper, in addressing the issue of how to promote approaches to philosophy of
religion “that are more historically grounded and religiously diverse” (2013, p. x;
2014, p. 137) than has typically been the case, recommends a threefold
methodology comprising “thick description, formal comparison, and multidimen-
sional explanation and evaluation of religious reason-giving” (2013, p. 75). With
regard to the first of these elements, Knepper argues for the claim that “thick
description of religious reason-giving in all religions for the sake of critical
understanding comes first” (p. 75, italics omitted), contending that in order to
provide the sort of thick description that he has in mind, one would need to consider
instances of reason-giving across a range of religions and in relation to the contexts
in which the reasons are put forward. This would itself involve asking questions
such as who “the speakers, audiences, and opponents” of the reasons are and under
what conditions these reasons are ever “contested, modified, and abandoned”
(pp. 37–38).
Although Knepper’s proposals are innovative and potentially transformative of
the subject, it is unclear why it should be “reason-giving” that is the primary object
of thick description, whether in the philosophy of religion or anywhere else. The
6 See also Wittgenstein’s recommendation to “Remember how many different kinds of thing are called
‘description’” (2009 [1953], §24).
7 It has been contended by at least one anthropologist (Jackson 2013, esp. pp. 13–14) that the term “thick
description” embodies a kind of anthropological hubris, since ethnographic description never really
succeeds in being anything other than thin. However polemically effective such a contention might be, it
does not of course show, or even purport to show, that all ethnographic descriptions are equally thin.
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examples that Knepper offers to illustrate what he means by “religious reason-
giving” are certain arguments presented by philosophers or theologians, such as the
arguments advanced by Śaṅkara in support of the “nondualist” view that, as
Knepper puts it, “there is no distinction between Brahman and Ātman” (2013, p. 80)
or, in Mahāyāna Buddhism, “Nāgārjuna’s argument that saṃsāra is nirvāṇa”
(p. 81). While these are no doubt worthwhile arguments to be investigating, by
focusing as closely as Knepper does upon the ideas of reason-giving and
argumentation there is a danger of overlooking the need for a more fundamental
level of investigation, which would consist in the task simply of trying to understand
what is meant when terms such as brahman, ātman, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are used.
What Knepper calls instances of reason-giving will indeed be among the discursive
contexts in which these terms occur, but they are not the only such contexts. A
fixation on reason-giving, especially where the paradigm cases are assumed to be
specimens of philosophical or theological argumentation, is liable to delimit the
benefits that thick description can bring to philosophy of religion.
Amid religious forms of life there will be instances of reason-giving, and these
will occasionally take the form of arguments, but religious life amounts to much
more than that. If philosophy of religion in general and the development of thickly
descriptive approaches to philosophy of religion in particular were to be
preoccupied exclusively with religious reason-giving, this would lead to a lopsided
conception of what goes on in religion. Whether, or to what extent, reason-giving
plays a part in religious activities ought not to be presumed in advance, but may be
disclosed by investigations that are not hampered by an unduly narrow focus at the
outset. What I propose is that thick description can enrich and broaden a
philosophical appreciation of the diversity or radical plurality not merely of
religious reason-giving but of varieties of religion more generally.
Radical pluralism: questioning lazy assumptions about religion
The term “radical plurality” or “radical pluralism” was formulated by the
philosopher D. Z. Phillips (2007, pp. 203–211) in order to capture both the nature
of religious phenomena in the contemporary world and an approach to the study of
those phenomena that seeks to do “conceptual justice” to religious and to
nonreligious perspectives in all their variety. Phillips contrasts radical pluralism
with the kind of religious or theological pluralism advocated by Hick (e.g., Hick
2004, Part 4). While pluralism of the latter sort presumes that all religions share
certain essential features, such as being directed towards a single divine reality or
espousing an ethic of mutual love and compassion, radical pluralism remains open
to the multifariousness of ontological and ethical commitments among people of
different religious and nonreligious points of view.
An important feature of a radical pluralist approach is a deliberate unwillingness
to neglect aspects of religion that one finds personally troubling or even repugnant.
Far from deciding in advance of the investigation what kinds of ethical or other
principles must be respected for any given perspective to count as properly
religious, the radical pluralist actively seeks out counterexamples to any general
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thesis about what a religious perspective “must” consist in. It is by that means that
lazy assumptions are challenged and a richer conception of the complexity of
religious phenomena is developed; it is in that spirit that, in my view, thickly
descriptive philosophy of religion is best carried out.
As we have seen, when Knepper offers examples of topics that call for thickly
descriptive investigation, he foregrounds occasions of reason-giving that take the
form of philosophical or theological arguments. This, we might think, is a
reasonable approach for a philosopher to take, given that philosophers are trained
specifically in methods of appraising arguments, normally in the form of written or
spoken discourse, rather than in gathering descriptive information about the lives
and daily interactions of complex sociocultural communities. Philosophers, after all,
typically do their research at their desks and in the library rather than “in the field.”
However, the fact that philosophers are not usually well equipped to undertake
fieldwork themselves need not preclude their adopting approaches to the study of
religion that exceed the mere analysis of arguments. Nor need it entail that the only
thick description in which a philosopher can engage is the devising of imagined
scenarios of the sort offered by Ryle. Among the other options available to
philosophers is that of drawing upon existing published material that provides thick
description of religiously relevant human phenomena. Such material, as I have
argued elsewhere (Burley forthcoming), could be in the form of insightful works of
narrative fiction, including literature, films and plays, or in the form of biographical
or autobiographical accounts; but so too, as I am proposing here, could it comprise
ethnographic studies by professional anthropologists. Indeed, familiarizing oneself
with a wide variety of ethnographic studies is one means of breaking out of the
prevalent philosophical obsession with, precisely, the aspects of religion that
involve reason-giving and argumentation, and thereby avoiding the fettered
understanding of religion that commonly results from a restricted palette of
examples.
In order to illustrate how a philosophical appreciation of the radical plurality of
religious phenomena can be enhanced through engagement with thick description
derived from ethnographic reports, I shall in the remainder of this article consider two
poignant examples. Although further examples and more detail than I have space to
provide here would be needed to make a thoroughly convincing case, I hope the
following discussion demonstrates at least the potential of the approach at issue.
Example 1: Animal sacrifice at the Kāmākhyā temple
A focus on the textual and, more specifically, the doctrinal or philosophical sources
of religious traditions has eventuated in a widespread neglect among philosophers of
religion of religious practices in general and of ritual practices in particular.8 In that
light, it is thus of little surprise that ritual animal sacrifice is very rarely mentioned
8 A notable exception is Schilbrack (2004); though, as Schilbrack himself admits in his introduction to
that volume, “There is at present a lack of philosophical interest in ritual. Philosophers (including
philosophers of religion) almost never analyze ritual behavior” (2004, p. 1).
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in the philosophical literature despite its prevalence in many religions throughout
history and across the world. It is perhaps difficult for many contemporary
philosophers of religion to know what to say about animal sacrifice, and this
difficulty is accentuated when the philosopher’s aim is to present religion as an
overwhelmingly benign and morally edifying force in human life: the ritual killing
of animals—let alone of human beings—does not fit neatly into the sanitized picture
of religion that many wish to paint. If, however, our aim is to do justice to the
radical plurality of religious phenomena, then, regardless of our personal moral
attitudes, blood sacrifices should not be excluded from our philosophical purview.
Among the many places in which animal sacrifice features prominently in
contemporary religion are various forms of goddess worship in India and Nepal. An
especially graphic description of such ritual practices is offered by Patricia Dold
(2011), who undertook collaborative fieldwork at the site of the Kāmākhyā temple
in the north-eastern Indian state of Assam during 2008 and 2009. Kāmākhyā is the
goddess of desire (kāma), and the Assamese temple complex in her honour dates
back to the sixteenth century (von Glasenapp 1928, p. 121). One of the major annual
festivals at the temple is dedicated to a snake goddess, Manasā, whose mythology
emphasizes her benevolence to devotees combined with belligerence towards “those
who refuse to worship her” (McDaniel 2004, p. 148). The festival, known as
Debaddhanı̄ or Deodhanı̄ [“sound or echo of the deity” (Smith 2006, pp. 140–141)],
takes place over a three-day period in August.
Animals are sacrificed daily at the Kāmākhyā temple all the year round, but this
escalates during festival periods. Integral to the proceedings of the Debaddhanı̄
festival is the ritual killing of dozens of animals, including goats, pigeons, cockerels
and water buffaloes. At the centre of the devotional activities is a group of between
nine and fifteen men who have temporarily become “possessed” by deities such as
the god Śiva and several forms of the goddess, including Kālı̄ and Kāmākhyā. For
the duration of the festival these men, known as Deodhās, become “sites of divinity”
(Smith 2006, p. 141), the highpoint of the festivities being a ceremonial dance in
which two of the Deodhās hold a scimitar blade-upwards while other Deodhās
dance barefoot upon it to the accompaniment of vigorous drumming. It is this event
that Dold describes in especially vivid terms.
Dold (2011, p. 55) recounts how, as the Deodhās are taking turns to dance on the
sword, there comes a moment when the mood of the observing crowd intensifies and
the people push forward “as a priest appears carrying a live pigeon.” The pigeon,
with its wings flapping, is lifted by the priest in front of the mouth of the Deodhā
who is now standing on the sword edge. “With a dramatic chomp of his teeth and
shake of his head,” the Deodhā bites off the bird’s head, an act that is repeated two
or three times by each of the Deodhās. As women in the surrounding crowd issue
the “piercing, high-pitched, and triumphant cry ‘ooolulululu’,” each Deodhā in turn
“chews, swallows, and then spits out clumps of flesh and feather.” In emulation of
the deities embodied in them, “the Deodhas are receiving animal offerings.”
Dold’s description of these occurrences is “thick” in the sense that it evocatively
captures something of the emotional atmosphere of the situation in addition to
reporting the basic sequence of events. It constitutes what Denzin (2001, p. 99)
terms “a form of performative writing” that enables “the willing reader to share
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vicariously in the experiences” being described. Although the details of the events at
issue are liable to stir feelings of disgust in many readers, it is precisely the
perspicuity of the description that facilitates this reaction. Framed by her exposition
both of devotional songs recited during the festival and of traditional mythic stories
involving deities relevant to the forms of worship that take place, Dold’s first-hand
description fosters a deepened understanding of the kind of meaning or significance
that animal sacrifice has within the context of worship—albeit a meaning or
significance that may not be straightforwardly articulable in terms other than the
description itself. There may thus be a sense in which, as Wittgenstein proposes in
response to James Frazer’s attempts to explain sacrificial rites, “Here one can only
describe and say: thus is human life” (1993, p. 121; translation amended).
Wittgenstein’s point is not that our understanding of a ritual cannot be enhanced
by further contextual information; on the contrary, adding contextual layers is
exactly what thick description involves. The point, rather, is to draw a distinction
between description and explanation: to urge caution about assuming that what
understanding a ritual consists in must be the crafting of an explanatory account,
perhaps couched in terms of what the ritual participants intend to achieve. At least in
many instances, Wittgenstein is suggesting, such purported explanations may in fact
deflect our attention from what is most significant in the ritual, leading us to
characterize what is going on in unduly intellectualized terms, as seeking to fulfil an
instrumental goal that is external to the ritual itself. Instead of immediately looking
for an explanation, Wittgenstein is recommending that we dwell longer with the
description, reflecting upon the kinds of feelings it stirs in us. In cases where the
ritual involves a blood sacrifice, whether this be a human or an animal offering, one
“answer to the question ‘why is this happening?’” might be simply “Because it is
terrible. In other words, what strikes us in this course of events as terrible,
impressive, horrible, tragic, &c., anything but trivial and insignificant, that is what
gave birth to them” (Wittgenstein 1979, p. 3e).
Dold herself does follow her description by briefly considering the meaning of
the ritual. Responding to the question of whether “bloodlust” plays a part, she notes
the regularity with which animals are sacrificed at the Kāmākhyā temple and the
“serious solemnity” with which these sacrifices are observed. Indicative of the
sanctity of the animals’ deaths, Dold proposes, is the fact that priests forbid the
taking of photographs at these moments.9 Denying that sacrifice at Kāmākhyā is “a
celebration of death or of the power to kill,” Dold speculates that what may be being
celebrated in the Deodhās’ receiving of animal offerings is “the living presence of
goddesses” (Dold 2011, p. 55).
A curious feature of Dold’s speculation is why she thinks the sacrificial rites
could not be both “a celebration of death or of the power to kill” and a celebration of
“the living presence of goddesses.” After all, Dold’s description of the theatricality
with which the pigeons’ heads are bitten off and of the triumphal vocalizations of
the assembled crowd is highly suggestive of an occasion that celebrates the power to
kill while, in view of the ferocious depictions of goddesses in relevant Hindu
9 Such prohibitions have not prevented the spread of numerous photographs and videos of animal
sacrifice at Kāmākhyā via the internet on websites such as YouTube.
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mythology, also graphically displaying the presence of the goddesses in the rituals’
protagonists. Indeed, it would seem highly plausible to propose that it is through the
celebratory acts of killing that the presence of the goddesses is enacted. Thus, while
it is entirely understandable to want to look for more than mere “bloodlust” in the
ritual, there is no need to discount the possibility that celebrating death and the
power to kill has something to do with it. We might also, following suggestions
from Rush Rhees and Phillips, see in the ritual an expression of “wonder at what is
terrible and what is evil … treating what is terrible as a sacrament” (Rhees 1994,
p. 578; cf. Phillips 2007, p. 205). None of this gives us an explanation of the ritual,
in the sense of attributing deliberate motivations or intentions to the ritual
participants; rather, it offers “possibilities of sense”—ways of aiding those to whom
the ritual is alien and remote to see how it might come to have a place in a form of
religious life. Such observations of possibilities of sense are among the contribu-
tions that philosophers as well as anthropologists can bring to the discussion of
descriptive accounts, though it is upon the anthropologists that the philosophers are
dependent for furnishing the descriptive accounts in the first place.
Example 2: Buddhism and bereaved Sherpas in Nepal
The Sherpas are an ethnic group residing primarily in the Himalayan mountain
range in northern Nepal. Male Sherpas are routinely employed by mountaineering
parties from western and other countries both to act as guides and to help with the
carrying of equipment and other tasks during climbing expeditions. Owing to the
extreme dangers involved in such expeditions, many Sherpas have suffered death or
injury as a consequence of this mode of employment, generating considerable
emotional trauma among Sherpa communities. An anthropologist who has studied
the Sherpas in depth is Sherry Ortner, in some of whose work particular attention is
given to Sherpa responses to the deaths of fellow Sherpas in climbing accidents.
It is often assumed by foreign mountaineers that Sherpas, who are predominantly
Buddhists, will be both fearless in the face of danger and emotionally detached
when accidents occur. A stereotype has developed of the steadfast Sherpa who is
hardy, sanguine and unselfish. Ortner documents how, though not without a grain of
truth, this stereotype is extremely one-sided. In reality Sherpas do sometimes feel
dispirited or even terrified by the circumstances they come up against on
expeditions, but these reactions are rarely tolerated by the mountaineers who
engage the Sherpas’ services. Drawing upon Edward Said’s (2003 [1978]) analysis
of “Orientalism”—where the latter term denotes a discourse that consolidates power
imbalances by “essentializing” Asian subjects as inferior and subordinate—Ortner
points out how Sherpas have been vulnerable to an Orientalist double bind.
Displaying anxiety or other negative emotions when accidents occur is viewed
contemptuously by foreign mountaineers, yet remaining impassive at such times is
liable to be perceived by those same mountaineers “as a strange, and almost
inhuman, form of ‘Oriental fatalism’” (Ortner 1997, p. 141).
While acknowledging, then, that the kind of analysis of power relations that Said
inherited and adapted from Michel Foucault has a legitimate role to play in the study
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of certain Asian communities, including that of the Sherpas, Ortner resists the facile
tendency, characteristic of some academics, to view this style of analysis as
precluding approaches that seek to expound the meanings of cultural phenomena,
especially religious meanings. Approaches of the latter sort are typified by Geertz,
who, as has been noted above, was instrumental in developing and popularizing the
notion of thick description in ethnographic writing. What Ortner (1997, p. 157)
argues is that “a rich and complex conception of culture and meaning in the
Geertzian sense” is not only compatible with but is complementary to an
examination of the discursive systems that instantiate and fortify “regimes of
power/knowledge,” in which the interests and the very lives of relatively
disempowered individuals and groups are subordinated to those of others. Far
from distracting us from issues “of how actors formulate needs and desires, plans
and schemes, modes of working in and on the world,” Geertz’s work offers “a
model for understanding the cultural construction of ‘agency’ in particular times and
places” (p. 158).
Within the context of this analysis of agency, Ortner presents an especially
poignant excerpt from her 1979 field notes. The excerpt describes an exchange
between the family of a Sherpa named Ang Phu, who had recently been killed while
assisting a mountaineering party on Everest, and a Buddhist Rinpoche (high lama)
with whom some other Sherpas and Ortner herself had been having lunch. Ortner
(1997, pp. 155–156; 1999, p. 141) recounts how Ang Phu’s father sobbed as he
prostrated and pleaded for the Rinpoche to grant a blessing. In response, the
Rinpoche remained “cool,” telling the man that, as a religious practitioner, he ought
to control his emotions, read prayerful texts and be a calming influence upon his
family. Then, Ortner reports, the Rinpoche “closed his eyes and chanted quietly to
himself for two or three minutes,” after which he recommended some passages from
his divination book that the father should read. Contemplating her own reaction to
the situation, Ortner remarks that she had felt shocked by the Rinpoche’s apparent
“lack of nyingje”—a term that can be translated as “compassion, sympathy, pity”—
and by the jocularity of his tone. Later, however, Ortner is told by one of her Sherpa
friends, Nyima Chotar, that this is simply how high lamas behave: even if it were to
be the lama’s own mother or father who had died, the lama’s grief would dissipate
after only five minutes’ meditation. Responding to Ortner’s contention “that the
lama showed no nyingje,” Nyima Chotar replied that what the lama had displayed
“was nyingje” (Ortner 1999, p. 141).
As in the case of Dold’s account of the sacrifice at Kāmākhyā, Ortner’s
description of the encounter between Ang Phu’s bereaved family and the Rinpoche
is “thick” inasmuch as it brings the situation to life for the reader, affording an
insight into the emotional demeanour and mutual interaction of the participants.
Unlike contrived examples such as Ryle’s delineation of the boy who contracts his
eyelids in order to practise imitating another boy’s wink, Ortner’s description does
not immediately disclose the intentions of the Rinpoche, for it is precisely these
intentions that are initially opaque to Ortner. But there is sufficient detail in the
description to enable the reader to make sense of Ortner’s subsequent interpreta-
tions, arrived at by reflecting upon the Rinpoche’s behaviour in the light of both
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Nyima Chotar’s comments and Ortner’s knowledge of Sherpa Buddhist culture
more generally.
One of the key issues accentuated by the described incident along with Ortner’s
own reflections upon it is the extent to which ethical and religious principles, such
as that of compassion, can be highly ramified and culturally inflected. When
philosophers of religion such as Hick or popular historians of religion such as Karen
Armstrong declare that, for example, love or compassion is an ethical ideal that is
“common to all the great traditions” (Hick 2004, p. 14) or that “All the world faiths
insist that true spirituality must be expressed consistently in practical compassion”
(Armstrong 2010, p. 8), there are good reasons to be wary about such
generalizations. One reason is that the very idea of “the great traditions” or “the
world faiths” is modelled on a “world religions paradigm” that has come
increasingly to be questioned by scholars who point out how it tends to obscure
from view the heterogeneity that exists both within and outside the purportedly great
traditions (see esp. Owen 2011). A second reason for wariness is that since notions
construable in terms of “love” or “compassion” may in fact not be prevalent in all
religious traditions, we risk unduly constraining our conception of religion if we
assume a priori that they are. And third, even when traditions do apparently share a
commitment to a compassionate ideal, it remains to be seen whether the ways in
which that ideal is expressed and actualized bear any resemblance across and
between distinct communities.
It is this latter point to which Ortner’s example sharply draws our attention, as
Ortner indicates that despite surface appearances, it is possible to understand the
Rinpoche’s “coldness” as an aspect of a “very specific higher Buddhist form of
‘compassion,’ which does not sympathize with grief in any ordinary sense, but
rather ‘shows the way’ out of it” (1999, p. 142). This is an important lesson that
thick description accompanied by culturally sensitive hermeneutical analysis can
teach both the anthropologist and the philosopher of religion: it reminds us to look
for the variegated possibilities of sense within a cultural or religious practice rather
than assuming that we already know in advance of attention to particular examples
what a certain concept, such as the concept of compassion, means—what senses it
has—within any given form of life.
Concluding remarks
The examples I have summarized above provide glimpses of the rich potential that
ethnographic thick description has to offer for expanding the range and depth of
philosophy of religion. The first example, of animal sacrifice at the Kāmākhyā
temple in Assam, shows how thick descriptions of religious practices offer
opportunities for philosophical reflection on aspects of religion that are otherwise
liable to be neglected. Taking my lead from Wittgenstein, and from certain
philosophers influenced by him, I have suggested that the aspects reflected upon
might include the possibilities of sense that a ritual can be seen to possess when we
shift our gaze from an exclusive preoccupation with instrumental explanation and
towards the ritual’s emotional resonances. But other modes of reflection are no
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doubt also available. The second example, of the response displayed by a high
Buddhist lama confronted by a bereaved Sherpa family, shows how the concept of a
virtue such as compassion might be culturally or religiously variegated, thereby
demanding caution on the part of philosophers who might be tempted to make
broad-brushed claims about the centrality of certain virtues to religions in general.
One way of developing the analysis of this example further would be to situate it
within a broader comparative framework, drawing comparisons not only with other
expressions of (what is commonly termed) compassion in Buddhist contexts but also
with ostensible instances of compassion from other religious traditions. Such
comparative analysis might reveal further variegation in the concept, or possibly
that some instances of what has been called “compassion” are better conceptualized
in other terms. My point here is not to prejudge the outcome of any such analysis but
merely to indicate directions in which future research might go.
In more general terms, then, what I have argued is that thick descriptions of
religious practices such as rituals, or of other interactions between religious
practitioners, can usefully contribute towards the undermining of facile assumptions
about what being religious “must” consist in and about what certain important
ethical or religious concepts “must” mean. If, as Hick among others has remarked,
philosophy of religion ought to be more than an inquiry into merely a very select
portion of religion (Hick 2010, p. 13), then access is needed to “religions in all their
variety and dimensions” (Schilbrack 2014, p. xi). Textual sources deriving from the
traditions themselves—including doctrinal, liturgical, mythological and theological
texts—afford valuable insights into the conceptual and doxastic dimensions of
religions, but religion amounts to far more than what is discernible in religious texts:
“‘reading’ religion must mean more than attending to the written word alone”
(Collins and Arweck 2006, p. 4). Without philosophers having to become
ethnographers themselves, existing ethnographies—whether these be written
accounts or audio and visual material—constitute one among other fertile resources
with which philosophers of religion can productively engage.
While attention to what Knepper (2013, 2014), following John Clayton (2006,
pp. 5–6), terms “religious reason-giving” is and should be of interest and importance
to philosophers of religion, there is no clear rationale for delimiting the use of thick
description to the exposition and analysis of this area of religious life. Philosophical
engagement with thick ethnographic description can go beyond the immediate and
relatively uncommon contexts of explicit reason-giving to examine the broader
repertoire of religious activities, many of which have been sorely neglected by
philosophers. The engagement need not be unidirectional; that is, it need not consist
exclusively in philosophers learning from ethnographic sources about the radical
plurality of religious forms of life. It might also take the form of philosophers
contesting assumptions that are present in anthropological analyses of the described
phenomena. Critical engagement of this kind has a long pedigree, especially within
the tradition of philosophy of religion influenced by Wittgenstein, and it is chiefly
upon this tradition that I have been drawing in this article to illustrate fruitful points
of intersection between philosophy and anthropology. But while Wittgensteinian
approaches are eminently well suited for such interdisciplinary interaction, they are
far from having a monopoly in this area.
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Philosophy of religion is itself methodologically pluralistic, and has the potential
to become more so. This strikes me as a strength rather than a weakness. What I
have contended in this article is that thickening the descriptive material with which
philosophers of religion operate is one important route towards an expanded
conception of philosophical inquiry into religion in all its variety.10
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